In comparison with traditional power grid system, smart power grid has the feature of distributed energy control with large amount of information transmission. Because the grid needs to collect users' usage data, privacy becomes a critical issue. Therefore, providing an efficient privacypreserving demand response scheme is vital to smart grid. We propose an efficient privacypreserving demand response scheme achieves confidentiality and integrity. The model transmits both real usage data and the future demand data for analyzing, comparing, and adjusting the generation and usage of electricity. In addition, updating keys can ensure users' data to be forward secrecy, and signature aggregation can reduce computation cost. The performance comparison with another scheme which also achieves key updating, shows that our scheme is more efficient in terms of computation and communication overhead; thus helping users save energy and maintain supply-demand balance.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, traditional power grid system has been gradually replaced by the smart grid due to some important features, such as distributed energy control, frequently interaction between users and control center, large amounts of data, intelligent applications and demand response. 1 2 Demand response is a mechanism that collects data from users, then analyze, process, predict the data and give some response. Demand response scheme can assist users to use energy efficiently and transfer non-emergent power demand from on-peak time to off-peak time. 3 Also, control center can analyze the real usage data and demand data to help the electricity suppliers to obtain the real-time electricity demand and adjust the amount of power output.
Though smart grid is reliable, flexible and efficient, there are some critical security challenges, i.e., the message injection attack, tampering the message and the DoS (denial of service) attack. If these challenges cannot be addressed properly, an adversary can launch attacks maliciously to degrade the performance of smart grid. 4 5 Therefore, preventing the messages from being tampered or exposed is very critical. At the same time, improving the efficiency of the scheme is also important.
The solution proposed in Ref. [6] adopts homomorphic encryption to aggregate the message to ensure confidentiality, preserve users' privacy and reduce the communication cost, but it does not consider the integrity of the message. They further improve the scheme to provide both confidentiality and integrity in Ref. [7] . They introduce an end-toend signature scheme which can generate a homomorphic signature for the aggregation result. But it requires all users to share the same private key. Once the adversary obtains the key, it can get the complete confidential message.
In Ref. [8] , the authors present an efficient demand response scheme which utilizes the homomorphic encryption to achieve privacy-preserving demand aggregation and response, also achieves forward secrecy. In comparison with existing schemes which have better efficiency in terms of computation and communication overheads, and can adaptively control the key evolution to balance the trade-off between the communication efficiency and security level. However, the procedure of updating keys is very complex and needs large amount of computation In this paper, we propose an efficient demand response scheme to achieve integrity and confidentiality. To guarantee forward secrecy we present a simple solution to update the secret keys, and to reduce the cost we propose to use the signature aggregation. 9 Specifically, the contributions of this paper are two aspects.
Firstly, we propose a new solution to update the keys to ensure the forward secrecy. This solution does not need to interact between users and control center every time, they just need to compute new key based on the current key respectively. To protect the keys from comprising, we reallocate the initial key every 10 or 100 times.
Secondly, we adopt an efficient signature aggregation scheme to reduce the communication and computation cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 reviews the homomorphic encryption, bilinear pairing, BLS short signature scheme, and signature aggregation and verification. Then, we propose the scheme in Section 4, followed by the security analysis in Section 5. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 6.
RELATED WORK
Research on smart grid includes many sides, i.e., power generation, transmission, distribution, 10-13 key distribution and management for power aggregation, 14 15 communication architectures for distribution networks within the smart grid, 16 secure data aggregation, 6 7 demand response scheme, 8 9 smart grid marketing 10 and multidimensional data encryption. 11 Among these topics, we are particularly interested in security and privacy of smart grid 4 identifies several security and privacy vulnerabilities in smart grid, and calls for attention and efforts from government, academia and industry 5 also reviews the security challenges in smart grid. Homomorphic encryption can achieve algebraic operations on the plaintext to be performed directly on the ciphertext and has been used in many data aggregation schemes. 17 18 These schemes are very promising and have triggered considerable following research work. 6 9 19 Li et al. 6 present a secure information aggregation scheme for smart grid. To protect the privacy of users, homomorphic encryption is used to secure the data en route. The proposed mechanism enables to gather the power data securely. But Lu et al. 19 proposed a privacy-preserving aggregation scheme for secure and efficient smart grid communications. By using homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem, it realizes multi-dimensional data aggregation approach. But this scheme assumed that the session keys are fixed. Once an adversary compromises the session key, it can decrypt any previous response message. In other words, forward secrecy cannot be guaranteed.
Li et al. 9 achieves forward secrecy by frequently updating keys, and can adaptively control the key evolution to balance the trade-off between the communication and security level. However, the method is very complex and needs large amount of computation and communication, that is verifiers need to verify a lot of messages which costing heavily computation. Moreover, the secret keys stored on the smart meters are not safe.
Our scheme utilizes signature aggregation to decrease computation and communication overhead efficiently, and to achieve better performance we transmit the real usage data and the demand data. In addition, we improve the key updating solution to ensure forward secrecy.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the homomorphic encryption, the bilinear pairing, BLS short signature scheme, signature aggregation and verification, which are closely related to the proposed scheme in this paper.
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) represents a group of secure encryption functions that allow certain algebraic operations on the plaintext to be performed directly on the ciphertext. HE is usually used for privacy-preserving applications (e.g., Data aggregation, e-voting). Wellknown homomorphic encryption schemes include: RSA, El Gamal, 20 Paillier, 21 Naccache-Stern, 22 etc. In this paper, we adopt the Paillier cryptosystem.
In the Paillier cryptosystem, the public key is pk N g , and the corresponding private key is sk
. Let E · , m, and r be the encryption function, a message and a random number, respectively. The ciphertext is
The plaintext is
Where L x = x −1 /N . Then, the additive homomorphic property is as follows:
Bilinear Pairing
Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same prime order q, and P be a generator of group G. Suppose G and G T are equipped with a pairing, i.e., a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map e G × G → G T such that e P P = 1 ∈ G T and e aP 1 bQ 1 = e P 1 Q 1 ab ∈ G T for all a b ∈ Z * q and any P 1 Q 1 ∈ G. Details can refer to. 19 
BLS Short Signature Scheme

Key Generation
Randomly select x R ← Z p and calculates y ← g x ∈ G; x and y are the private and public keys respectively; x ∈ Z p and y ∈ G; ← is assignment.
Signature Generation
where H is a collision-resistant hash function such that H 0 1 * → G; Then, verifier computes ← h x where ∈ G is signature and sends it to the receiver.
Signature Verification
When the receiver obtains the signature , the public key y and the message M, it computes h ← H y M ;
Then it performs verification:
e h y = e g 3. 4 . Signature Aggregation and Verification
M m with its own public key y 1 y 2 y m by BLS scheme, respectively.
Then, aggregate all m signatures into a single signature:
Verifier can obtain m users' public keys y 1 y 2 y m , one signature aggregation 
OUR SCHEME
In this section, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving demand response scheme, which consists of three phases: initialization, data aggregation, message processing and key updating.
We consider the network model for smart grid as a hierarchical network which is comprised of control center (CC), building area network (BAN) and home area network (HAN), as shown in Figure 1 . The CC covers n BANs, and for the sake of simplicity, we assume each BAN consists of m HANs. Each HAN is assigned a smart meter enabling an automated, two-way communication between the BAN and the HAN user. Meantime, each BAN is equipped with a gateway, named as BG. And, the topology is a tree structure in our scheme as shown in Figure 2 .
Initialization
The control center (CC) is in charge of bootstrapping the whole smart grid system. Firstly, CC generates the system parameters: bilinear parameters q P G G T e , a secure cryptographic hash function H 0 1 * → G, homomorphic encryption's public key N g , and the corresponding private key . Then, CC publishes the system parameters as pubs = q P G G T e H N g and keeps the private key secretly. Secondly, when a BG i i = 1 2 n wants to join the system, CC generates the private key x i and public key y i for it as follows:
Thirdly, when a HAN user U ij j = 1 2 m wants to join BG i , BG i generates private key x ij and public key y ij for it as follows: Fig. 3 . Procedure of encryption and signature.
Data Aggregation 4.2.1. Encryption and Signature
In our scheme, each HAN user U ij ∈ BG i i = 1 2 n j = 1 2 m has two pieces of message to transmit: the real usage data a ij and the demand data d ij . It performs the following operations as shown in Figure 3 :
Firstly, U ij encrypts the messages as follows:
Secondly, U ij generates ij on M ij , where M ij = c a ij c d ij T S, TS is the current timestamp to prevent replay attack:
Finally, U ij sends M ij ij to BG i .
Aggregation and Verification
M im and m signatures i1 i2 im , respectively, it performs the following operations as shown in Figure 4 :
Firstly, BG i computes h ij ← H y ij M ij ∈ G and im ← h x im im ∈ G, where j = 1 2 m. Secondly, BG i generates the aggregation signature: 
CC
BG n e(σ 1, 2, ..., n , g) = ∏ e(h i , y i ) 
Message Processing and Key Updating 4.3.1. Message Processing
After CC receives distinct n messages M 1 M 2 M n and n signatures 1 2 n , respectively, it performs the following operations as shown in Figure 5 :
n. Secondly, CC generates the aggregation signature:
Thirdly, CC verifies the aggregation signature as follows:
e h i y i Then, after the validity checking, CC computes the aggregated real usage data and demand data on c a i and c d i by using homomorphic encryption as follows: Finally, control center can analyze the real usage data and the demand data, and compare these data for predicting the future usage. With the help of prediction, it can give the response. For the sake of simplicity, CC can publish the response message directly. Therefore, this can help users to save energy and adjust their using time from peak time to non-peak time for lower electricity bills.
Key Updating
To provide forward secrecy, we update the private key x and public key y each round. After CC verifies the correctness, all the users and BGs update the keys based on the current keys respectively, then delete the current keys and keep the new keys secretly.
But there is a deficiency that once an adversary gets the current key, it can compute all the following keys. So, we propose to generate a new initial key every l times, such as ten or twenty times. If we consider the security level is more important than efficiency, the system can choose a small number, like l = 5. Otherwise, a larger number is needed, like l = 30.
The updating operation is as follows: For user U ij , the initial key is x ij y ij , where x ij ∈ Z P and y ij = g x ij ∈ G. After the first transmission, both CC and U ij update the keys by computing:
After updating l times, CC generates a new initial key and grants it to U ij through a secure channel.
Similarly, BG i and CC perform the same operation to update keys.
ANALYSIS
Security Analysis
The security properties of our scheme are analyzed in this section. There are three aspects need to be considered, the confidentiality and privacy-preservation of the message, the source authentication and data integrity, the forward secrecy of users' keys and the keys' updating.
Confidentiality and Privacy-Preservation Analysis
In our scheme, data is encrypted by a homomorphic cryptosystem, only the users themselves and the CC can decrypt the ciphertext. Others cannot get the plaintext even though they eavesdrop the ciphertext since they do not have the private keys. On the other hand, BGs only aggregate the ciphertext and cannot decrypt the message. Therefore, the confidentiality of the data can be ensured.
Furthermore, when CC receives the message, only the aggregation results can be decrypted, it still cannot get each user's data. This means that the privacy-preservation can be guaranteed.
Source Authentication and Data Integrity
Analysis In our scheme, we use signature aggregation to reduce the computation cost. Each user signs the message by using the private key, and then sends the signature to the BG it belongs to. Then, BG verifies the signature. So, the integrity of the messages can be guaranteed.
Forward Secrecy and the Key Updating Analysis
In our scheme, the keys are updated each time, and the previous keys are deleted after the computation of new keys. As a result, even if an adversary compromises user U ij , it cannot get any previous keys. Therefore, the forward secrecy of users' keys is achieved.
Moreover, we generate new initial keys every l times for higher security level. Even though the key is gained by an adversary, it cannot get the message after using new keys.
Finally, we present the comparison results of security level in Table I . From the table, we can see that the scheme 6 only achieves confidentiality, the scheme 7 achieves confidentiality and data integrity, the scheme 19 achieves confidentiality, data integrity and authenticity, and the scheme 8 achieves confidentiality, data integrity, authenticity and forward secrecy. EPPDR scheme 9 achieves additional key updating compared with the scheme. 8 Our 
Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the computation and communication overheads of the key updating between user U ij and BG in both our scheme and EPPDR scheme. 9 
Computation Overhead Analysis
Compared with exponentiation operations in G, hash operations and modular operations are negligible. 24 In our scheme, as described in Section 4.3.2, U ij and BG i computes l ij new private keys and l ij new public keys with l ij exponentiation operations, respectively. Thus, the total computation overhead is 2l ij * e m , where denote the computation overhead of a exponentiation operation by e m . In comparison, the total computation overhead is l ij * c m + 2l ij * c p in EPPDR, in which the computation overhead of a multiplication operation in G and a pairing operation by c m and c p , respectively.
Experiments were conducted on a 2.5 GHz-processor, 2 GB memory computing machine with MIRACL and Pbc 25 libraries to track the execution time. For G over the FST curve, a single multiplication operation costs 1 ms and the corresponding paring operation costs 3 ms. Meantime, an exponentiation operation in Z * q costs 1 ms. The comparison of computation overhead is shown in Figure 6 . We can see that our scheme achieves lower execution times compared to EPPDR scheme. 9 
Communication Overhead Analysis
In EPPDR, 9 for evolving l ij session keys, U ij firstly sends message to BG i . Then, BG i responds a message to U ij . According to EPPDR, 9 the total communication overhead is 161 * l ij + 80 + 80 + 336 bits. In comparison, in our scheme, for updating keys, we just need to transmit the private key x ij every l ij times. Let x ij be 1024 bits. Thus, the total communication overhead is 1024 bits. Figure 7 shows the communication overhead for updating keys in both EPPDR and our scheme. We can see that our scheme achieves lower communication cost compared to EPPDR.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-preservation demand response scheme with signature aggregation and key updating in smart grid. It achieves privacy-preservation and confidentiality based on homomorphic encryption, integrity and source authentication by using signature aggregation based on bilinear map and BLS short signature scheme, and forward secrecy by updating keys based on hash function. Then, we analyze security and performance of our scheme, also compare it with some previous schemes. For our future work, we will explore more challenging security issues in smart grid.
